A simple transposition in the text would, I venture to suggest, remove one or two of the many difficulties of this obscure chapter.

When Pythodorus in 411 B.C. moved in the Athenian Assembly his decree that Commissioners should be elected to draft measures for the security of the State, Cleitophon added a rider instructing the Commissioners προσαναξητσαι κα τος πατρονς νμονς ος κλειδθνης θηκεν τε καθδτη τν δημοκραταν, πως ν κοσαντες κα τοτων βολεσωντααι τ ριστον. The instruction appears to have struck Aristotle as paradoxical and inept, for he has appended an explanation of Cleitophon's reasons which is also a criticism: ς ο δημοτικν (...) λλ παραπλησαν οσαν τν Kλεισθνους πολιτεαν τ Σλωνος. Indeed one would never imagine that the constitution of Cleisthenes as described by Aristotle could have been seriously suggested as a model or a repertory of precedents for legislators intent, like Cleitophon's friends, on restoring the πτριος πολιτεα, which it obviously disestablished; and the conjunction of τοĐς πατρουσ with τε καθστη τν δημοκραταν might seem to make the proposal a challenge or a mockery. Aristotle had already given his opinion that by Cleisthenes' innovations δημοτικωτρα πολĐ τς Σλωνος γνετο πολιτεα He recognized democratic features in Solon's laws, but they lay in the redress of social wrongs or in the method of administering justice rather than in the organization of the government; he regarded Solon's political changes, not as the establishment of democracy proper, but as a reform, conservative rather than revolutionary, of existent institutions. His comment on the rider implies that he would not have corrected Cleitophon if he had referred the Commissioners to Solon's ancestral laws, but to refer them to Cleisthenes' must, he thought, be ignorance, irony, or idiosyncrasy. (shrink)

On the Athenian disaster at Aegospotami the reaction, suppressed half a dozen years before, against the régime responsible for the war and its calamitous results sprang up again with double force. The capture of the fleet, the loss of the empire, which had been a useful buffer between the selfish interests of the wealthier citizens and the predatory appetites of the proletariate, the bankruptcy of the treasury, the discredit of the whole democratic system, the grim privations of the blockade, and (...) the imminent return of the exiles eager for power and vengeance, all portended the speedy downfall of the constitution, should the victorious enemy leave it standing. Yet the progress of the revolution was slower than might have been expected. In fact the oligarchs were at first crippled by the absence of their banished chiefs, andthroughout they had to reckon not only with a people which had long enjoyed liberty and empireand with a democratic administration already in office, but also with the middle party, disgusted indeed with the existing form of government but unwilling to substitute for it the rule ofa narrow privileged class, and led by a statesman of great ability and experience. (shrink)

Lysias, describing how the Thirty were established in the government of Athens, begins with the sentence ναστς δ θηραμνης κλευσεν ὑμς τρι$κοντα νδράσιν πιτρΨαι τν πóλιν τῇ πολιτεᾳ χρσθαι ν Δρακοντδης πφαινεν Commenting on the last clause the judicious Thirlwall observes that ‘the precise meaning of these words is very doubtful. There is almost equal difficulty, whether we suppose that they refer to a proposition then made, or to one which was to be made, by Dracontides.’ Thirlwall has not expressed (...) his meaning as precisely as Lysias; the uncertainty lies, not in the words, nor in the reference intended by Lysias, but in the mind of the historian, who is conscious that, whether he refers the proposition of Dracontides to the occasion indicated by Lysias or to another, he will encounter almost equal difficulty. The difficulty however, arising from the apparent inconsistencies in the evidence of the ancient authorities on the date of the appointment of the Thirty, is not Thirlwall's only, and after a century of discussion it still vexes every student of the period. (shrink)

The traditional text of Thucydides, II. 1, dates the surprise of Plataea by the Thebans, which began the Peloponnesian war, έπì ΠυΘοδώρου τι δύο μνας ρχοντος Αθηναίοις. It has long been recognized that the two months are too short a time, and that the facts of the history demand four. The day cannot be precisely determined, but the narrative of Thucydides fixes it near the end of a lunar month, and the choice has lain between the new moons of March (...) 8 and April 7, 431 B.C. Now that Meritt has shown that the year of Pythodorus was not intercalary and ended on July 2, the former must be accepted. Accordingly the Theban attack may be put on the night of, let us say, March 3, which by Attic reckoning would be the early hours of Anthesterion 27. (shrink)

Thucydides, II. 28, records an eclipse of the sun in the summer of the first year of the Peloponnesian war. It can be no other than the annular eclipse of the 3rd of August, 431 B.C. He describes the phenomenon so accurately and with so many details that we can hardly doubt that he observed it himself — Tο δ' αủτο θέρονς γονμηνι κατά σελήγηγ, σπερ και μόγογ δοκει ειναι γιγνεσθαι δνγατόγ, ό λιος έξέλιπε μετά μεσημβριαγ και πάλιγ άγ επληρθη, (...) γενόμενος μηνοειδής και άστέρν τινν έκΦανέντων. (shrink)